This update presents previously unpublished material and translations of difficult-to-find records. We wish to believe. The cost of invasion, they knew, would be high. The total destruction of that city, and the instant incineration of 40,000 mostly civilian people, occurred just three days after the destruction of Hiroshima by a 15-kiloton uranium bomb, which instantly killed 70,000. J. Samuel Walker has cited this document to make the point that contrary to revisionist assertions, American policymakers in the summer of 1945 were far from certain that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would be enough in itself to force a Japanese surrender. [24], In a memorandum to George Harrison, Stimsons special assistant on Manhattan Project matters, Arneson noted actions taken at the recent Interim Committee meetings, including target criterion and an attack without prior warning., Henry Stimson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress), Stimson and Truman began this meeting by discussing how they should handle a conflict with French President DeGaulle over the movement by French forces into Italian territory. For more on these developments, see Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration," 486-488. Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Magic Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18. Two scientists at Oak Ridges Health Division, Henshaw and Coveyou, saw a United Press report in the Knoxville News Sentinel about radiation sickness caused by the bombings. This point is central to Alperovitzs thesis that top U.S. officials recognized a two-step logic: relaxing unconditional surrender and a Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Japans surrender without the use of the bomb. [4]. 100 (copy from microfilm). The 509th Composite Groups cover story for its secret mission was the preparation of Pumpkins for use in battle. Intimidation to the brim On August 1945, America dropped an atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today, historians continue to debate this decision. This document has also figured in the argument framed by Barton Bernstein that Truman and his advisers took it for granted that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and that there was no reason to explore alternatives to military use. Maddox, 102; Alperovitz, 269-270; Hasegawa, 152-153. [46] During the meeting on August 24, discussed above, Stimson gave his reasons for taking Kyoto off the atomic target list: destroying that city would have caused such bitterness that it could have become impossible to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. Stimson vainly tried to preserve language in the Potsdam Declaration designed to assure the Japanese about the continuance of their dynasty but received Trumans assurance that such a consideration could be conveyed later through diplomatic channels (see entry for July 24). Stimson, who later wrote up the meeting in his diary, also prepared a discussion paper, which raised broader policy issues associated with the imminent possession of the most terrible weapon ever known in human history., In a background report prepared for the meeting, Groves provided a detailed overview of the bomb project from the raw materials to processing nuclear fuel to assembling the weapons to plans for using them, which were starting to crystallize. For on-line resources on the first atomic test. [6]. And on Aug. 6, a bomb would fall on Hiroshima, ultimately killing an. [11], Documents 6A-D: President Truman Learns the Secret, G 77, Commanding Generals file no. Japans cultural capital, Kyoto, would not stay on the list. The translations differ but they convey the sticking point that prevented U.S. acceptance: Tokyos condition that the allies not make any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler., Papers of Henry A. Wallace, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa (copy courtesy of Special Collections Department). An account of the cabinet debates on August 13 prepared by Information Minister Toshiro Shimamura showed the same divisions as before; Anami and a few other ministers continued to argue that the Allies threatened the kokutai and that setting the four conditions (no occupation, etc.) Over 200,000 people were killed. Initialed by President Roosevelt (VB OK FDR), this may have been the closest that he came to a formal approval of the Manhattan Project. It is part of the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program. The combination of the first bomb and the Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Tokyos surrender. Sato cabled Togo earlier that he saw no point in approaching the Soviets on ending the war until Tokyo had concrete proposals. Any aid from the Soviets has now become extremely doubtful.. The atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Read more, The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. Every major country of the time was involved in the war. It is 28 inches in diameter and 120 inches long. At the end, Stimson shared his doubts about targeting cities and killing civilians through area bombing because of its impact on the U.S.s reputation as well as on the problem of finding targets for the atomic bomb. [56]. The war had shown that the Japanese were fighting for the Emperor who convinced them that it was better to die than surrender. Claypool, 1984) With such motivation to back them, the United States felt justified in dropping the atomic bomb in order to prevent the spread of communism in Europe by intimidating Russia. [14]. Washington's biggest test blast was 1,000 times as large. The ban on the public use of the phrase was officially lifted when the war ended on August 15, which prompted Hiroshimas local newspaper, the Chgoku Shimbun, to print a few photos of the destroyed city on August 23. The final decision to drop the atomic bomb, when it was made the following day, July 25, was decidedly anticlimactic. Washington, D.C., August 4, 2020 To mark the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the National Security Archive is updating and reposting one of its most popular e-books of the past 25 years. Alperovitz, 226; Bernstein, Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender,Diplomatic History19 (1995), 237, note 22. [18]. This summary included intercepts of Japanese diplomatic reporting on the Soviet buildup in the Far East as well as a naval intelligence report on Anglo-American discussions of U.S. plans for the invasion of Japan. Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. Some of the key elements of Stimsons argument were his assumption that Japan is susceptible to reason and that Japanese might be even more inclined to surrender if we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty. The possibility of a Soviet attack would be part of the threat. As part of the threat message, Stimson alluded to the inevitability and completeness of the destruction which Japan could suffer, but he did not make it clear whether unconditional surrender terms should be clarified before using the atomic bomb. After the first successful test of the atomic bomb in 1945, U.S. officials immediately considered the potential non-military benefits that could be derived from the American nuclear monopoly. Signed by about 68 Manhattan Project scientists, mainly physicists and biologists (copies with the remaining signatures are in the archival file), the petition did not explicitly reject military use, but raised questions about an arms race that military use could instigate and requested Truman to publicize detailed terms for Japanese surrender. [65], Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, Transcript/Draft B. The point was to keep the bombing mission crew safe; concern about radiation effects had no impact on targeting decisions. How much Power does a President actually have? When he learned of the atomic bombing from the Domei News Agency, Togo believed that it was time to give up and advised the cabinet that the atomic attack provided the occasion for Japan to surrender on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. The alternative is prompt and utter destruction. The next day, in response to questions from journalists about the governments reaction to the ultimatum, Prime Minister Suzuki apparently said that We can only ignore [mokusatsu] it. The bomb missed Gregg's house by just 100 yards, and the explosion caused by the TNT trigger created a hole in Walter Gregg's garden that measured 24 feet in depth and 50 feet in width. objectives. In Japan and elsewhere around the world, each anniversary is observed with great solemnity. According to Hasegawa, Hirohito had become convinced that the preservation of the monarchy was at stake. My analysis will provide some historical and political context and offer an initial assessment of these documents. McCloy was part of a drafting committee at work on the text of a proclamation to Japan to be signed by heads of state at the forthcoming Potsdam conference. For useful discussion of this meeting and the other Target Committee meetings, see Norris, 382-386. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows, nuclear threats are real, present, and dangerous. That is why, on August 8, Japanese newspapers first reported that the enemy used a new type of bomb in attacking Hiroshima, but the details are still under investigation., The phrasing a new type of bomb ( shingata bakudan) was used because the expression atomic bomb ( genshi bakudan) was prohibited by the Japanese government during the war. Brewster suggested that Japan could be used as a target for a demonstration of the bomb, which he did not further define. For more on the debate over Japans surrender, see Hasegawas important edited book,The End of the Pacific War: A Reappraisal(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), with major contributions by Hasegawa, Holloway, Bernstein, and Hatano. a. According to the official US version of history, an A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and another on Nagasaki three days later, to force Japan to surrender. The U.S. reply, drafted during the course of the day, did not explicitly reject the note but suggested that any notion about the prerogatives of the Emperor would be superceded by the concept that all Japanese would be Subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. The language was ambiguous enough to enable Japanese readers, upon Hirohitos urging, to believe that they could decide for themselves the Emperors future role. For example, Bernstein cites the entries for 20 and 24 July to argue that American leaders did not view Soviet entry as a substitute for the bomb but that the latter would be so powerful, and the Soviet presence in Manchuria so militarily significant, that there was no need for actual Soviet intervention in the war. For Brown's diary entry of 3 August 9 1945 historians have developed conflicting interpretations (See discussion of document 57). Three days later, it dropped another on Nagasaki. According to Frank, the actual total of deaths due to the atomic bombs will never be known, but the huge number ranges somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people. With the Japanese surrender announcement not yet in, President Truman believed that another atomic bombing might become necessary. A new body of scholarly work emerged, often based on hitherto unavailable documents, which countered revisionist arguments that the atomic bomb was primarily a diplomatic weapon in 1945, that Japan would have surrendered prior to the planned U.S. invasion had the bomb not been used, and that projected casualty figures for the anticipated invasion The force of B-29 nuclear delivery vehicles that was being readied for first nuclear usethe Army Air Forces 509th Composite Grouprequired an operational base in the Western Pacific. [21] An engineer for the Kellex Corporation, which was involved in the gas diffusion project to enrich uranium, Brewster recognized that the objective was fissile material for a weapon. [39], The last item discusses Japanese contacts with representatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland. At the end of the meeting, he announced that he would report to Hirohito and ask him to make another Sacred Judgment. Bix appears to have moved toward a position close to Hasegawas; see Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,Japan Focus. [42]. Was there another way to end the war? [19]. Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,Japan Focus. The contacts never went far and Dulles never received encouragement to pursue them. For background on Magic and the Purple code, see John Prados,Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), 161-172 and David Kahn,The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing(New York: Scribner, 1996), 1-67. "The US decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the USSR in the post-second World War era rather than strictly a military measure designed to force Japan to unconditionallysurrender" Procedure: Use the documents, textbook pages 845-849, and your knowledge of the era to support a position on One of the reports key findings was that a fission bomb of superlatively destructive power will result from bringing quickly together a sufficient mass of element U235. That was a certainty, as sure as any untried prediction based upon theory and experiment can be. The critically important task was to develop ways and means to separate highly enriched uranium from uranium-238. Besides discussing programmatic matters (e.g., status of gaseous diffusion plants, heavy water production for reactors, and staffing at Las Alamos), the participants agreed that the first use could be Japanese naval forces concentrated at Truk Harbor, an atoll in the Caroline Islands. Every August, newspapers are dotted with stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, accompanied by a well-picked-over but never resolved . I am lost! Did Truman authorize the use of atomic bombs for diplomatic-political reasons-- to intimidate the Soviets--or was his major goal to force Japan to surrender and bring the war to an early end? On 25 July Marshall informed Handy that Secretary of War Stimson had approved the text; that same day, Handy signed off on a directive which ordered the use of atomic weapons on Japan, with the first weapon assigned to one of four possible targetsHiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki. Library of Congress, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-36. The total area devastated by the atomic strike on Hiroshima is shown in the darkened area (within the circle) of the photo. An importanton-line collection focuses on the air-raids of Japanese cities and bases, providing valuable context for the atomic attacks. Stimson accepted the language believing that a speedy reply to the Japanese would allow the United States to get the homeland into our hands before the Russians could put in any substantial claim to occupy and help rule it. If the note had included specific provision for a constitutional monarchy, Hasegawa argues, it would have taken the wind out of the sails of the military faction and Japan might have surrendered several days earlier, on August 11 or 12 instead of August 14. Which of the following was least likely a reason for Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb? To what extent did subsequent justification for the atomic bomb exaggerate or misuse wartime estimates for U.S. casualties stemming from an invasion of Japan? [1]. Thus, the extent to which the bombings contributed to the end of World War II or the beginning of the Cold War remain live issues. See also Barton J. Bernstein, Looking Back: Gen. Marshall and the Atomic Bombing of Japanese Cities, Arms Control Today, November 2015. Why did the Americans decide to carry out these attacks? His vivid account shows that senior military officials in the Manhattan Project were no longer dismissive of reports of radiation poisoning. Russia is very much in the minds of the people who give any thought to world affairs, and distrust and suspicion of her are very widespread. On August 10, one day after the bombing of Nagasaki, the . The events leading up to the dropping of the first atomic bomb can be traced back to 7 th December 1941, when the Japanese attacked the US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour. For more recent contributions, see Sean Malloy,Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), Andrew Rotter,Hiroshima: The World's Bomb(New York: Oxford, 2008), Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko,The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War(New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008), Wilson D. Miscamble,The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. The peace party, however, deftly maneuvered to break the stalemate by persuading a reluctant emperor to intervene. [3] The NASM exhibit was drastically scaled-down but historians and journalist continued to engage in the debate. Of course, the Allies ignored this for the reason that dropping the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would intimidate Russia. Information from the late John Taylor, National Archives. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), Ground view of Nagasaki before and after the bombing; radiuses in increments of 1,000 feet from Ground Zero are shown. While post-war justifications for the bomb suggested that an invasion of Japan could have produced very high levels of casualties (dead, wounded, or missing), from hundreds of thousands to a million, historians have vigorously debated the extent to which the estimates were inflated. At the outset, three possibilities were envisioned: radiological warfare, a power source for submarines and ships, and explosives. Barton J. Bernstein, Introduction to Helen S. Hawkins et al. By early August he decided that 9-10 August 1945 would be the best dates for striking Japanese forces in Manchuria. 576 words. Pumpkins referred to bright orange, pumpkin-shaped high explosive bombsshaped like the Fat Man implosion weapon--used for bombing run test missions. Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson found the criticisms troubling and published an influential justification for the attacks inHarpers. 961 Words4 Pages. For casualty figures and the experience of people on the ground, see Frank, 264-268 and 285-286, among many other sources. According to what Byrnes told Brown, Truman, Stimson, and Leahy favored accepting the Japanese note, but Byrnes objected that the United States should go [no] further than we were willing to go at Potsdam. Stimsons account of the meeting noted Byrnes concerns (troubled and anxious) about the Japanese note and implied that he (Stimson) favored accepting it, but did not picture the debate as starkly as Browns's did. This memorandum from General Groves to General Marshall captured how far the Manhattan Project had come in less than two years since Bushs December 1942 report to President Roosevelt. There were battles and military posts in surprising places. The Japanese Search for Soviet Mediation, VII. As these cables indicate, reports of unfavorable weather delayed the plan. Therefore, we are publishing an excised version of the entry, with a link to the Byrnes note. The US went forward with their actions so they can prevent a mass loss of their population from any actions japan might present. Debates on Alternatives to First Use and Unconditional Surrender, IV. Stimsons account of the events of 10 August focused on the debate over the reply to the Japanese note, especially the question of the Emperors status. Moreover, the collection includes for the first time translations from Japanese sources of high level meetings and discussions in Tokyo, including the conferences when Emperor Hirohito authorized the final decision to surrender. Explain your answer. Also documented are U.S. decisions to target Japanese cities, pre-Hiroshima petitions by scientists questioning the military use of the A-bomb, proposals for demonstrating the effects of the bomb, debates over whether to modify unconditional surrender terms, reports from the bombing missions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and belated top-level awareness of the radiation effects of atomic weapons. Social critic Dwight MacDonald published trenchant criticisms immediately after Hiroshima-Nagasaki; seePolitics Past: Essays in Political Criticism(New York: Viking, 1972), 169-180. Within a few days Japan surrendered, and the terrible struggle that we call World War II was over. Japan, sensing conflict was inevitable, began planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor by April, 1941. In keeping with General Groves emphasis on compartmentalization, the Manhattan Project experts on the effects of radiation on human biology were at the MetLab and other offices and had no interaction with the production and targeting units. If you were President Truman in 1945, would you have dropped the bomb? Possibly not wanting to take responsibility for the first use of nuclear weapons, Army Air Force commanders sought formal authorization from Chief of Staff Marshall who was then in Potsdam, RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, Files no. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, and the following day the United States dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, killing an additional 100,000 people. Historians have used this item in the papers of Byrnes aide, Walter Brown, to make a variety of points. Willingness to accept even the destruction of the Army and Navy rather than surrender inspired the military coup that unfolded and failed during the night of 14 August. Japan was already a day late in responding to the Byrnes Note and Hirohito agreed to move quickly. [5]. Whether this meant that Truman was getting ready for a confrontation with Stalin over Eastern Europe and other matters has also been the subject of debate. Part II of the summary includes the rest of Togos 2 August cable which instructed Sato to do what he could to arrange an interview with Molotov. Zenshiro Hoshina, a senior naval official, attended the conference and prepared a detailed account. RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 20, Envelope G Tinian Files, Top Secret, The prime target for the second atomic attack was Kokura, which had a large army arsenal and ordnance works, but various problems ruled that city out; instead, the crew of the B-29 that carried Fat Man flew to an alternate target at Nagasaki. He wanted to end war in the Pacific without having to invade Japan b. By Marc Gallicchio. For the early criticisms and their impact on Stimson and other former officials, see Barton J. Bernstein, Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,Diplomatic History17 (1993): 35-72, and James Hershberg,James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), 291-301. In the surprise attack, Japan sunk several ships, destroyed hundreds of planes and ended thousands of lives. Responding to this threat, the United States placed an embargo on scrap metal, oil, and aviation fuel heading to Japan and froze Japanese assets in the United States. The numbered items are military and industrial installations with the percentages of total destruction. The discussion depicted a Japan that, by 1 November, would be close to defeat, with great destruction and economic losses produced by aerial bombing and naval blockade, but not ready to capitulate.